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A U.S. aeronautics museum purchased a vintage World War I airplane
in England and arranged to have it shipped from Britain to New York on a
British-flag carrier. The bill of lading contained a forum selection clause
that read in part: "Any litigation arising out of this bill of lading shall be
governed and construed under English law and resolved in an English
court. No other court shall have jurisdiction over any such litigation."
Under the agreement, the airplane would be shipped on deck. The
carrier failed to properly strap down the cargo, however, and the airplane
was severely damaged when it shifted position during heavy weather in the
crossing. The shipper would like to bring suit in a U.S. District Court un-
der admiralty jurisdiction, where the potential for recovery would be
greater than in the English courts. The carrier, however, asserts its rights
under the forum selection clause of the bill of lading to litigate in an Eng-
lish court. How should a U.S. court decide the validity of this forum se-
lection clause?
An analysis of the above hypothetical is fraught with conflict.
Whether a court in any country decides to validate a forum selection clause
in a bill of lading depends on several variables. First, it may look to any
one of three international maritime agreements,2 depending on whether that
* Member, Class of 1998.
1. This hypothetical was adopted from one used in the Judge John R. Brown Admi-
ralty Moot Court Competition. The author would like to thank Graydon S. Staring, of
counsel to the San Francisco law firm Lillick & Charles, L.L.P., for providing this mate-
rial and for his helpful suggestions on the topic for this Note.
2. There are currently three international conventions on maritime law. See Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25,
1924, 51 Stat. 233, reprinted in WmLiAM TETLEY, MARINE CARGO CLAIMS (2d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter "Hague Rules"]; Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, (entered
into force June 23, 1977), reprinted in TETLEY, supra [hereinafter "Visby Protocol"];
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, March 31, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608 (1978)
[hereinafter "Hamburg Rules"]. Each has been ratified by a number of maritime coun-
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particular country has ratified any agreement. Next, it may look to its own
substantive law on maritime claims, which may be modeled after any of
the international agreements or may be domestically generated.3 Finally, it
may look to interpretations of any of these laws in its own domestic courts.
Such decisions may either comport or conflict with decisions of courts in
other countries in cases based on similar facts.
Interpretation is perhaps the most grievous of these problems, because
the application of the same clause from an international convention or an
identical clause in a domestic law can lead to two different results in the
courts of two countries. Although application disparities occur for a num-
ber of maritime law points,4 the case of the forum selection clause is quite
illustrative of this conflict.
For example, while neither the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA) nor the Hague Rules contains a section that would either vali-
date or invalidate a forum selection clause, each contains the following
provision:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss, or damage to or in con-
nection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the
duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such li-
ability, otherwise than as provided in this Act, shall be null and void
and of no effect. A benefit of insurance in favor of the carrier, or simi-
lar clause, shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from li-
ability.5
The question open to interpretation by domestic courts is whether a
forum selection clause constitutes a "lessening of liability," anod therefore
is invalid. This question would constitute the paramount issue in the above
hypothetical. In settling the question of liability, an English court will be
bound by the limits set out in the Visby Protocol,6 which are substantially
tries.
3. See, e.g., Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 ('1936) (codified
as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1994)) [hereinafter "U.S. COGSA"]. U.S.
COGSA is a domestic U.S. maritime law modeled on the Hague Rules.
4. For the necessity of uniformity in maritime laws governing deck carriage, the
navigational fault liability, fire liability and other issues, see Michael F. Sturley, Interna-
tional Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of
Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1987) [hereinafter "Sturley, International Uni-
form Laws"].
5. U.S. COGSA §3(8); Hague Rules §3(8).
6. Visby Protocol Art. 2 sets a unit limitation amount at 667 SDRs per package or
unit, or 2 SDRs per kilogram of gross weight. An SDR is a monetary unit tied to a sys-
tem that uses a "special drawing right" set by the International Monetary Fund. See
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higher than those proscribed in the U.S. COGSA.7 On the other hand, a
court deciding this case under U.S. COGSA may hold the carrier to a "fair
opportunity doctrine," thus allowing the shipper to argue complete recov-
ery of the cargo's value.
8
Certainly, choice of forum in this case will affect the carrier's liabil-
ity. Thus, the District Court in which such a case is brought would have to
decide whether moving the case to an English forum as the carrier wants
would lessen the carrier's liability, and if so, whether that in turn would
violate U.S. COGSA.
This Note proposes to consider the validity of forum selection clauses
in bills of lading used in litigation between shippers and carriers of inter-
national goods by sea. It will address the problem in four parts. The first
part presents an overview of current maritime law, focusing on the three
international maritime law conventions and the position each takes in re-
gards to forum selection clauses. Part Two will analyze U.S. law in depth,
looking at U.S. COGSA and the resulting line of court cases that have in-
terpreted forum selection clauses in light of that law. Part Three consti-
tutes a comparison of the positions of other maritime nations on the valid-
ity of forum selection clauses in bills of lading. Finally, Part Four looks at
possible solutions or compromises to the differing interpretations that
could bring the lack of uniformity in international law in line.
I. The Current State of International Maritime Law
A. Perceived Need for Uniformity Prompts the Hague Convention
Before the last half of the nineteenth century, worldwide shipping was
governed by a hodge-podge of domestic laws and policies that provided no
assurances to shipper or carrier of a just treatment in settling any dispute.
The first legal attempt to rectify this situation by creating uniformity was
made under U.S. law when Congress passed the Harter Act in 1893. The
Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea
Carriage of Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions, 23
TRANsP. L.J. 471, 482 (1996).
7. U.S. COGSA section 4(5) limits a carrier's liability to "S500 per package... or
in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit." U.S. COGSA §
4(5).
8. The "fair opportunity doctrine" as it applies to carriers is spelled out in: New
York New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953). It states:
"[O]nly by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower
liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit
recovery to an amount less than the actual loss sustained."
9. Phillip A. Buhler, Forum Selection and Choice of Lmv Clauses in International
1998]
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purpose of the Act was to unify the law for goods carried by sea with ports
of origin or destination in the United States. The Act specified liabilities
and defenses shippers and carriers might use in settling contract disputes
and provided that U.S. courts should hear all such claims.I'
Although the Harter Act provided some certainty for U.S. goods en-
tering and leaving U.S. ports, its provisions conflicted with other nations'
laws. 2 The instability this conflict created in the rest of the world led
other maritime nations to call a convention in 1921 at the Hague to draft
uniform rules that would govern shipping worldwide.
1 3
The British government was instrumental in spearheading this effort
after its Imperial Shipping Committee issued a report in 1920 that pro-
moted uniform legislation throughout the British Empire.' 4 With this re-
port and the Harter Act as a basis, the International Maritime Committee
set about drafting uniform rules for maritime shipping nations that resulted
in the final version of the Hague Rules signed at the Fifth International
Conference on Maritime Law on August 25, 1924.15
The purpose of the Hague Rules was to allocate clearly the responsi-
bility for cargo losses in international shipments.' 6 In order to allocate
losses effectively, the rules set out standard terms that could be incorpo-
rated into bills of lading to delegate responsibility for cargo loss and dam-
age in international shipments. Generally under international law, carriers
were liable for cargo losses unless certain exceptions applied.' 7  The
Hague Rules strictly limited protections for carriers, allocating resR onsi-
bility in their direction and strengthening legal recourse for shippers.
The Hague drafters envisioned that these Rules would settle differ-
ences inherent in the common law of the various shipping nations that
plagued dispute resolution in cases of questionable liability fbr cargo loss
Contracts: A United States Viewpoint With Particular Reference to Maritime Contracts
and Bills of Lading, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1995).
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id.
12. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 476.
13. Id. at 476-77.
14. J. Hoke Peacock III, Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules
and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: An Alternative Approach to the Interpretation of
International Uniform Acts, 68 TEx. L. REv. 977, 982 (1990).
15. Id. at 982.
16. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 735.
17. Sturley lists the available exceptions as Act of God, act of public enemy, inherent
vice of the goods, or fault of the shipper. Id. at 735 & n.26.
18. See id. at 735.
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Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading
or damage.19 The drafters were acutely aware of the different results those
varied common laws could create in resolving cargo liability claims. Even
contemplation of harmonizing the laws of two similar nations-Great Brit-
ain and the United States--caused Sir Norman Hill to remark at the Lon-
don Shipping Conference Report proceedings in 1921 that, "common sense
seems to be influenced by climate, for an English lawyer is quite unable to
understand... the manner in which the Judges in the United States will ap-
ply the principles of Common Law."
20
Yet the drafters fully realized the benefits associated with uniformity
that still exist for modem carriers and shippers, especially certainty, pre-
dictability, convenience, and stability.2' By carefully defining the respon-
sibility of each party to an international shipment including bankers, ship-
pers, carriers and underwriters, they strived to increase certainty with
uniform rules.22 Furthermore, the drafters hoped uniform rules would sim-
plify commerce23 as well as reduce insurance costs and litigation?'
Despite these perceived benefits, some of the Hague Rules drafters
harbored lingering concerns that a uniform law would limit or do away
with freedom of contract. Yet in the end, they agreed with the argument of
French delegate Louis Franck that a lack of uniformity also effectively
limits freedom of contract?' Franck spoke for all the drafters in making
the following case for uniform maritime legislation:
[if we have] an International Convention... then at least all the shipowners
and cargo owners will know where they are, and you will have your ships and
your cargoes finding everywhere, in all ports, and on all seas, a clear, intelli-
gible, and fair legislative system which will be uniform everywhere.
26
B. The Hague Rules
In their quest for a uniform maritime law, the Hague Rules drafters
looked to currently existing statutes, basing their rules on a 1910 Canadian
statute, which in turn was based on the U.S. Harter Act.
27
19. See 2 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF COGSA AND THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOMF.S
OF THE HAGUE RuLEs 425 (Michael Sturley ed., Carole Boyle trans., 1990).
20. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19, at 181.
21. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 73 1.
22. Peacock, supra note 14, at 986.
23. I- at 986.
24. Id at 986-87.
25. LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 19, at 428.
26. Id. at 418.
27. Michael F. Sturley, Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
1998]
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The Hague Rules establish a basis on which shipowners are liable for
cargo loss and damage. They also prohibit shipowners from contractually
exempting themselves from liability, but at the same time provide seven-
teen defenses for shipowners. 28 As previously noted, they also limit liabil-
ity to $500 per package.29
No provision in the Hague Rules prohibits a forum selection clause,
even if the chosen forum is not a signatory country to the Rules, as long as
carrier liability otherwise imposed by the Rules is not relieved by the
clause.30 Thus, forum selection and choice of law clauses are valid under
the Hague Rules as long as they are not directly violative of any other
clause of the Hague Rules.
3 1
On the other hand, from the legislative history the Hague Rules draft-
ers clearly did not wish to incorporate enforcement of forum selection
clauses? 2. That issue was left to national law, which resulted in application
inconsistency.
33
While Great Britain ratified the Hague Rules almost as soon as they
were drafted, the United States hesitated for twelve years before approving
a domestic law that paralleled the international one. 4 A year later, in
1937, the United States finally ratified the international convention.3 5 By
the time World War I[ began, most European shipping nations had joined
the Hague Rules' ratifiers, so that a majority of the world's shipping na-
tions had signed on by the start of the war. 6
Currently, around seventy-seven nations are in contract under the
Hague Rules. 7 Some of these are developing nations, such as the Latin
American countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay and
Peru. 8 It should be noted that a number of ratifiers also subscribe to the
18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 609, 610-11 (1996).
28. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 477.
29. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, §4(5), 51 Stat. 233, reprinted in TETLEY, supra note 2. See also
Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 477, 488.
30. Buhler, supra note 9, at 16.
31. Id.
32. Sturley, ProposedrAmendments, supra note 27, at 657.
33. Id.




38. Buhler, supra note 9, at 16. It is worthy of note that Colombia, Venezuela, Bra-
zil and Chile have not ratified the Hague Rules, despite significant maritime economies.
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Visby Protocol, which updates the Hague Rules. The Rules and the Proto-
col are often referred to jointly as the Hague-Visby Rules.
C. The Visby Protocol
The Visby Protocol was promulgated in 1968 by a diplomatic confer-
ence as a response to the containerized shipping revolution.39 In the 1960s,
ocean carriers began experimenting successfully with a new method of
stowing cargo in eight-by-forty foot metal containers instead of in break-
bulk holds as in the past.40 This new stowage method significantly af-
fected cargo contract liability in many ways, including the limitations of
liability per "package."
The Visby Protocol was written to amend and update the Hague Rules
to the new shipping techniques.41 The Visby Protocol preserved the basic
Hague Rules, including carrier duties of care and due diligence. Thus,
most case law developed under the Hague Rules was also preserved.
42
However, the Visby Protocol, like the Hague Rules, neglected to pre-
clude use of forum selection clauses in bills of lading.43 Yet, the Protocol
did incorporate the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right
(SDR) Protocol,44 the most significant effect of which was to increase the
maximum liability for carriers from the $500 per package under section
4(5) of the Hague Rules to the higher of 667.67 SDRs or 2 SDRs per kilo-
gram of goods. 45 However, incorporation of the Hague Rules without the
SDR Protocol can precipitate a grave disharmony. The effect of such in-
complete incorporation is to lower carrier liability in contravention of see-
tion 3(8) of the Hague Rules.46
Many countries that had ratified the Hague Rules subsequently rati-
fied the Visby Protocol as amendments to the original Rules, including
Canada, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, China, and most western
39. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 611. See also Mandelbaum,
supra note 6, at 480.
40. Sturley, ProposedAmendments, supra note 27, at 611.
41. Mandelbaun, supra note 6, at 480.
42. Id.
43. Buhler, supra note 9, at 31.
44. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 612 n.13; see also supra note
6.
45. Mandelbaumn, supra note 6, at 488.
46. Note that the wording of the Hague Rules §3(8) is identical to that of U.S.
COGSA §3(8) quoted above. See supra note 5.
19981
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European states.47 In fact, 63.9 percent of all U.S. trade is with a partner
who has ratified the Visby amendments.
48
The United States, however, has not ratified the Visby amendments,
and neither have many of her Latin American trading partners.49 In the
United States, two opposing political lobbies complicate ratification. The
shippers' lobby desires the heightened liability ensured by the Visby
Amendments; while the carriers' lobby adamantly opposes it.50 Congress
appears unwilling to act in the face of this conflict.
51
D. The Hamburg Rules
In 1978, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
revised the Hague Rules in a document that became known as the Hamburg
Rules.52 The Hamburg Rules significantly differ from the Hague-Visby
Rules and would increase carrier liability.5 The Hamburg Rules primarily
achieve increased carrier liability by affirmatively permitting forum selec-
tion clauses that shippers could use to their advantage in litigating cargo
loss and damage claims. The only provision is that the chosen forum have
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
5 4
Article 21(1) of the Hamburg Rules gives the plaintiff the option of
instituting an action in ".... a court which, according to the law of the State
where the court is situated, is competent .... ,55 That court may be located
in a principal place of business or principal residence of the defendant; the
place where the contract was made if the defendant has contacts there; the
port of loading or discharge; or any additional place designated for that
purpose in the contract of carriage by sea.
56
In addition, the Hamburg Rules increase carrier liability under the
SDR Protocol to 835 SDRs (from 667.67 SDRs under Visby) or 2.5 SDRs
per kilo (from 2 SDRs under Visby).57 The Hamburg Rules further in-
crease carrier liability by restricting use of the term "per package," so that
47. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 612. See also Mandelbaum,
supra note 6, at 491.
48. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 491.
49. Buhler, supra note 9, at 31.
50. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 481.
51. Id. at 481.
52. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 612.
53. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 482.
54. Buhler, supra note 9, at 33.
55. Id. at31.
56. Id.
57. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 488.
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it does not apply to an entire container; rather, "package" must refer to the
type of package designated in a bill of lading.5 The Hamburg Rules also
favor shippers by allowing damage claims based on weight rather than the
value of a package. 59
Needless to say, the Hamburg Rules appeal mostly to nations that im-
port and export but do not carry their own goods in international trade. In-
deed, the greatest criticism of the Hamburg Rules is that few nations have
adopted them so far, and no major industrialized nation has adopted
them.60 Thus far, only twenty-two countries have ratified the Hamburg
Rules,61 representing about two percent of U.S. trade.62 Seven of the rati-
fiers are landlocked states with no ports.63 However, it is worth noting that
Chile is among the ratifiers. Chile will be among the next signers on the
North American Free Trade Agreement and may influence other Latin
American nations to sign
.6
The United States has not ratified the Hamburg Rules,65 nor is it likely
to do so soon. For one, the Hamburg Rules increase carrier liability, thus
devastation of what little is left of the U.S.-flag fleet is anticipated.6
However, if the United States were to adopt these rules, it would have a
major influence on their ratification internationally.
67
I. U.S. Maritime Law: Statutory and Case Law
A. The 1936 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
The U.S. Congress first dealt with the problem of nonuniformity in
maritime law by enacting the Harter Act in 1893.68 While the adoption of
the Harter Act singled out the United States as a world leader in maritime
law, the adoption of COGSA was more difficult. Between the 1923 draft-
ing of the Hague Rules and the 1936 adoption of COGSA, Congress tried
several times to enact domestic maritime legislation. 69 The 1936 enact-
58. 1 at 483.
59. Id at 483.
60. Sturley, ProposedAmendments, supra note 27, at 614.
61. Id. at 612.
62. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 491.
63. Id. at 484.
64. Buhler, supra note 9, at 32.
65. Id at 32.
66. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 500.
67. Id at 491.
68. Buhler, supra note 9, at 15.
69. Peacock, supra note 14, at 983.
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ment of COGSA substantially superseded the earlier Harter Act, although
much of the same language has been retained. °
COGSA was not primarily intended to change the existing law, but
rather to make U.S. law consistent with worldwide maritime law on bills of
lading.71 COGSA generally reflects the language used in the Hague Rules,
and is, indeed, identical in most parts.
Aside from uniformity, however, the drafters were also concerned
about protecting American shippers engaged in foreign trade.72 In line with
this concern, COGSA's enacting clause and section 13 mandate that do-
mestic law governs all contracts for carriage of goods by sea when the port
of entry or discharge is in the United States.73 To underscore this point,
two years after Congress passed COGSA, the United States emphasized,
upon ratifying the Hague Rules, that in case of inconsistencies the provi-
sions of COGSA would prevail.74
Thus, the policy behind COGSA is not entirely supportive of interna-
tional law. COGSA will not apply, however, where U.S. shippers or carri-
ers ship goods between two foreign ports unless the parties so stipulate in
their bill of lading.
75
Like the Hague Rules and the Visby Protocol, COGSA does not di-
rectly comment on the -validity of forum selection clauses. 76 Although a
provision in section 3(8) invalidates any clause in a bill of lading that
"lessens liability," there is no evidence that this subsection. was drafted
with forum selection clauses in mind. Indeed, the legislative history lends
support to the idea that subsection 3(8) was never intended -to govern fo-
rum selection clauses.
77
70. Christine N. Schnarr, Foreign Forum Selection Clauses Under COGSA: The Su-
preme Court Charts New Waters in the Sky Reefer Case, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 867, 871 n.32
(1996).
71. Richard C. Mason, Book Review, 7 TEMP. INTL'L & CoMP. L.J. 161 (1993) (re-
viewing MICHAEL F. STURLEY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY
SEA AcT AND THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE HAGUE RULES (1993)),
72. Alan Nakazawa & B. Alexander Moghaddam, COGSA and Choice of Law
Clauses in Bills of Lading, 17 TuL. MAR. L.J. 1, 14 (1992).
73. COGSA §1300 and 1312; see also Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra
note 4, at 781.
74. Nakazawa & Moghaddam, supra note 72, at 14.
75. Buhler, supra note 9, at 26.
76. Elizabeth A. Clark, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and Foreign Forum Selection
Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V Sky Reefer, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 483, 486 (1996). -
77. Sturley, ProposedAmendments, supra note 27, at 657.
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COGSA has remained the preeminent U.S. domestic statutory law for
maritime issues since its adoption in 1936. Yet, the shipping indistry has
changed significantly since then, both in terms of technology and eco-
nomic dynamics. COGSA's failure to keep up with these changes has cre-
ated the major problem for the Act. A second problem is that, despite its
purported purpose of unifying maritime law, varying court interpretations
have nullified the symmetry between the U.S. COGSA and the maritime
laws of other major shipping nations!'
B. Case Law: Interpretation of Choice of Forum Clauses Under
COGSA Under the 1967 Indussa Decision
Historically, the United States has been reluctant to recognize choice
of forum clauses in any context. 9 One of the earliest examples of litiga-
tion over choice of forum in maritime law was in Knott v. Botany Mills,
decided in 1900.80 In that case, the Supreme Court held that, under the
Harter Act, a clause in a bill of lading stipulating that British law would
apply where a cargo of wool was carried on a British vessel from Argen-
tina to New York was null and void.8'
Early U.S. interpretations of the Hague Rules failed to invalidate fo-
rum selection clauses despite the reasoning that under subsection 3(8) car-
rier liability would be "lessened" under such clauses. In William H. M-uller
& Company v. Swedish American Line, the Second Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's argument that forcing litigation in Sweden would lessen the car-
rier's liability because of undue expense on the shipper. 2 The Muller
court upheld the forum selection clause on independent principles of law,
citing the reasonableness of the forum.83 This reasoning was followed in
subsequent cases. In deciding forum selection clause issues in maritime
cases, the courts applied general principles of law instead of relying on
COGSA or the Hague Rules.84
This interpretation changed dramatically when the Second Circuit de-
cided Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg in 1967, citing COGSA subsection
3(8) and finding that its lessening liability language would invalidate fo-
78. 11 at 613.
79. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 777.
80. See Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 76 (1900).
81. Buhler, supra note 9, at 14-15.
82. See William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d
Cir. 1955).
83. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 27, at 778.
84. let at 782.
1998]
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rum selection clauses under COGSA.8 5 This holding effectively overruled
Muller, which the court stated had been "wrongly decided."8' 6
In Indussa, a shipment of nails and barbed wire from Belgium arrived
aboard the Norwegian carrier Ranborg at its San Francisco destination
damaged by rust. A jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading designated the
carrier's principal place of business as the forum for litigation of any
claims. When Indussa Corp. brought suit in rem in the Southern District of
New York, the Norwegian shipowners moved to invoke the jurisdiction
clause. The Second Circuit refused to honor the clause, holding that, be-
cause the claim was so small, requiring removal to a foreign forum less-
ened the carrier's liability in violation of COGSA subsection 3(8).87
The Indussa court cited three reasons for its holding. First, the practi-
cal difficulties of litigating in a foreign forum place a "high hurdle" in the
way of enforcing liability; 88 next, liability will be lessened in any forum
where neither COGSA nor the Hague Rules apply;89 and finally, even
where a foreign court will apply one of these two laws, there is no guaran-
tee that the results will be the same as if a U.S. court applies them.9
0
In making its holding in Indussa, the court rejected foreign forum
clauses because it concluded that Congress intended COGSA to govern all
disputes over bills of lading written under its statutes.91 Thus, the U.S.
courts essentially rejected the international maritime law of the Hague
Rules, preferring domestic interpretation under COGSA.
U.S. courts persisted in their refusal to enforce forum selection
clauses in bills of lading through several similar cases.92 In Union Insur-
ance Society of Canton v. S.S. Elikon, for instance, the Fourth Circuit in-
validated a forum selection clause designating a German forum in a dispute
over a bill of lading between a German carrier and an American shipper,
holding that COGSA applied to the carriage and therefore litigation in
Germany was not appropriate.93 Until 1995, subsequent bill of lading
cases continued to follow the Indussa reasoning without fail.9
85. See Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 205 (1967).
86. See id. at 204.
87. See id. at 205.
88. See id. at 203.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 203-04.
91. Nakazawa & Moghaddam, supra note 72, at 4-5.
92. Buhler, supra note 9, at 25.
93. See Union Ins. Soc. of Canton v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 723-724 (4th Cir.
1981).
94. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 871.
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C. The Sky Reefer Decision Reversed the Indussa Holding in 1995
'In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed gears on the Indussa line of
cases when it decided Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/VSSky Reefer.95 In
a complete about face, Sky Reefer held that forum selection clauses in bills
of lading covered by COGSA are valid, overturning twenty-eight years of
precedent.
96
In Sky Reefer, a cargo of fruit from Morocco to New York on a Japa-
nese carrier for a U.S. shipper was damaged en route. A clause in the bill
of lading forced arbitration in Japan, but the shipper brought suit in federal
district court in Massachusetts. When the Japanese shipowner moved to
stay the action and compel arbitration in Tokyo, the matter reached the
U.S. Supreme Court, which held the arbitration clause valid.97 While the
actual holding of the Sky Reefer concerned an arbitration clause, the court
in dictum referred to the Indussa holding and indicated it would apply
analogous reasoning to forum selection clauses.
98
The Court subsequently upheld this reasoning in Effron v. Sun Lines
Cruises.99 Ostensibly, ruling this dictum into law undermines the broad
goals of the U.S. COGSA subsection 3(8), to prevent inappropriate limita-
tions on carrier liability. 1' °
In making its holding, the Supreme Court consciously embraced a de-
parture from interpretation under domestic law and towards an internation-
alist view. In explaining its reasoning, the majority focused on compliance
with the internationalist goals of the Hague Rules and on harmonizing U.S.
law with that of other countries.,01 The Court also indicated that interna-
tional policy interests supported its holding, since the United States's
reputation in the international community benefits from honoring interna-
tional obligations, such as the Hague Rules.10 2 In addition, the Court re-
ferred to other common law countries that have upheld foreign forum se-
lection clauses under the Hague Rules subsection 3(8), implying that this
holding brings the United States in line with those decisions.1
°3
95. See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MfV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540
(1995).
96. Schnarr, supra note 70, at 868.
97. See Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 540.
98. See idt at 540.
99. See Effron v. Sun Lines Cruises, 67 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995).
100. Clark, supra note 76, at 485.
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Although Sky Reefer may be more in line with international precedent
than Indussa, the Court's reasoning takes a leap away from its international
counterparts in interpreting subsection 3(8), which is identical in COGSA
and the Hague Rules. The Sky Reefer Court purports that the term "liabil-
ity" does not refer to an ultimate cost liability, as it has been interpreted in
all previous cases; rather, it proposes the term refers to "legal" liability, or
the carrier's duty of due diligence
1 4
The interpretational effect is to nullify those cases in which the cost to
a shipper of litigating in a foreign forum was held to "lessen the liability"
of a carrier. In accordance with the Sky Reefer holding, forum selection
clauses will be held valid if a carrier is liable to litigation in the designated
forum, regardless of the shipper's projected recovery and expenses. In
making this holding, the Court said that COGSA subsection 3(8) had been
misinterpreted in previous cases. 05
IV. Comparison of Other National Interpretations
of Maritime Law
A. Great Britain
As is the case with the U.S. COGSA, the British COGSA is substan-
tially identical to the Hague Rules, though Britain has enacted the Visby
Protocol amendments. 06 However, the similarity does not bring British
court decisions in line with U.S. or international precepts. English court
rulings on forum selection clauses are generally made on domestic princi-
ples of English law, irrespective of accordance with the Hague Rules or
principles of uniformity in international law.1
0 7
Enforcement of forum selection clauses under English law is variable,
and about one-half the cases are enforced. 10 8 While in general British law
favors the carrier, forum selection clauses Will not be enforced if the specific
forum chosen reduces the carrier's liability in a given case, or when the court
considers the chosen forum less appropriate for some other reason.
109
104. See id. at 536.
105. See id. at 534.
106. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, ch. 19 (U.K.) [hereinafter "British
COGSA"] (enacting Hague-Visby Rules, as amended by Merchant shipping Act 1981,
ch. 10, §2 (U.K.) (implementing Brussels Protocol) (superseding Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, ch. 22 (U.K.) (enacting Hague Rules).
107. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 787.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 783.
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The variability of these holdings is illustrated by a comparison of two
recent British choice of forum cases. In The Hollandia,"0 the court invali-
dated a forum selection clause where litigation in Amsterdam would have
lessened the carrier's liability because of distinct statutory limits in Dutch
domestic law."' In The Benarty, however, the British court enforced a fo-
rum selection clause that designated a forum in Indonesia, even though In-
donesian domestic law substantially limited the claim." 2  The Benarty
court reasoned that Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules did not prohibit en-
forcing the clause.1
3
British courts have shown a reluctance to accept the lessening of li-
ability argument in other cases as well." 4 This may stem from the British
perception that choice of forum clauses are inherently a procedural, not a
substantive, matter. Because of this kind of thinking, no English court has
held that a choice of forum clause is an inherent violation of the Hague
Rules Art. 3(8).5
In summary, British courts have based their interpretations of the
Hague Rules Art. 3(8) on general principles of domestic law, and not on
internationalist policy as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Sky Reefer. While
the results vary from case to case, the reasoning is generally inconsistent
with any principles that influence decisions made under identical language
in the laws of other nations and the Hague Rules.
B. Australia
Australian domestic maritime laws are an example of laws responding
to an industry in transition. Until 1991, Australia acted under its 1924 Sea-
Carriage of Goods Act, which banned choice of forum clauses. 16 Enacted
in the same year the Hague Rules were ratified, the 1924 Australian act
made no reference to the international agreement's provision against less-
ening liability in Art. 3(8), preferring to handle the choice of forum clause
with an explicit national statute.
17
110. See The Hollandia, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (1982).
111. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 787.
112. Iad at 786.
113. Id
114. See, e.g., Maharani Woollen Mills Co. v. Anchor Line, 29 Lloyd's Rep. 169
(C.A. 1927).
115. See id. at 785.
116. Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924, No. 22, § 9(2) (Austl.).
117. Australia is not the only country to have done this. New Zealand, South Africa,
Lebanon and Syria also enacted statutory bans on forum selection clauses. See Sturley,
International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 776-77.
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Australia's subsequent Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1991 does an
almost complete about-face on this parochial thinking by adopting the most
recent international agreements.1 8 The Hague Rules as amended by the
Visby Protocol were ratified immediately, as was the SDR Protocol. The
Act also provided for ratification of the Hamburg Rules after three years,
although as of 1996 the Australian Parliament had not yet taken that
step.lip
Although the Australian Parliament commented that its rationale for
prospective adoption of the Hamburg Rules was to update Australia's
maritime laws in face of new technologies, loading methods, and other
practical considerations concerning shippers, it deferred implementation
until 1994, at which time it believed the Hamburg rules would have gained
greater international acceptance. 120 The Parliament's subsequent failure to
enact these rules most likely stems more from the lack of international ac-
ceptance than any perception by the Australian government that the rules
are inherently problematic or ineffective.
C. Scandinavian Countries
In contrast, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark have taken the
unconventional step of substantially adopting the Hamburg Rules.121 This
departure from more conservative maritime law arose from the Scandina-
vians' belief that the Hamburg Rules were forward-looking. 22 Essentially,
domestic maritime law in those nations now represents a compromise be-
tween the Hague Rules amended by the Visby Protocol and the Hamburg
Rules.1
3
Although at first glance this step seems somewhat incongruous with
the Scandinavians' support for uniform international law, 124 it can also be
perceived as a cutting edge response to changing technologies and realities
in maritime shipping.
The Scandinavian law implements all the jurisdictional provisions of
the Hamburg Rules, including enforced choice of forum clauses. 25 How-
ever, they do not incorporate the stepped-up liability limits of the Hamburg
118. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 491.
119. Id. at491-92, 492 n.170.
120. Id. at 492.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id.
123. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 661 n.282.
124. Id.
125. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 494; see also supra notes 53-56.
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Rules. Under these laws, liability limits remain the same as they had been
under the Hague-Visby regime.
V. Two Recommendations Towards a Uniform Interpretation
of Forum Selection Clauses in Bills of Lading
A. The United States ShouldAct to Replace COGSA
As presently codified, the U.S. COGSA is outmoded both as a method
of risk allocation 27 and as a reflection of modem transportation technolo-
gies and practices.128 Although it represents only one voice among the
world's trading nations, U.S. trade is substantial and its impact influential.
Thus, an update of its domestic maritime shipping law would help set a
foundation for increased uniformity and modernization of maritime ship-
ping law worldwide.
Neither Congress nor the international transportation and trade com-
munity is unaware of this situation. Thus, in 1992 the Maritime Law As-
sociation of the United States ("MLA") formed an ad hoc committee to
formulate a proposal to update COGSA which could be presented to Con-
gress. 129 The proposal would retain existing law largely unchanged, but
would introduce some elements in common with the HagueNisby regime
and clarify some domestic judicial doctrine inconsistent with international
law. 130 The result would be an updated U.S. domestic law, but current
problematic gaps with international law would still remain.
13,
The proposed COGSA would specifically address the choice of forum
problem by codifying a new statute that would invalidate a choice of for-
eign forum any time a shipment enters or departs from a U.S. port or a car-
rier receives or delivers goods in the United States. 32 Foreign forum se-
lection clauses would still be governed by general maritime law, and not
the proposed 3(8), however, if a claimant brought suit in the United States
because jurisdiction over the carrier was only obtainable there.'3 Addi-




127. Id at 498.
128. Id at 497.
129. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 616.
130. Id at 621.
131. Id
132. Id at 658. For specific wording of the proposed clause, see Id. at 676-77.
133. Id.
134. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 496.
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Congress and the maritime community generally believe that the
United States must take a more international approach to maritime law.
35
The Supreme Court also supported this thinking in the Sky Reefer deci-
sion. 36 The merit of the proposed new COGSA is that it furthers that goal
by incorporating more law from international sources in U.S. domestic
maritime law. Moreover, the principal source incorporatecl-the Visby
Protocol--is much more modem than the 1924 source of the current
COGSA.
The problem, however, is that the proposal does not reach far enough.
On the issue of forum selection, for example, it takes the parochial view of
codifying domestic law as paramount; whereas, the clear mandate of Sky
Reefer is to validate a foreign forum selection if appropriate.): 7 Following
this decision, the Supreme Court's interpretation has been in discord with
domestic maritime law, and the proposed new COGSA would not remedy
that situation.
A better approach would be to adopt an international agreement as
domestic law that would bring the U.S. in line with trading partners and
harmonize U.S. domestic law with the Supreme Court decision in Sky
Reefer. To this end, the MLA has recommended adoption of the Visby
Protocol. 38 The Visby Protocol has the advantage of being written in re-
sponse to containerized shipping, and so addresses modem problems more
adequately than the Hague Rules or present U.S. COGSA.' Additionally,
it has been adopted and implemented by all major U.S. trading partners.
Although adoption of the Visby Protocol would synchronize U.S. law
with other maritime trade nations, it has significant failings, like the pro-
posed new COGSA. While Visby is more modem than current law, it still
was written in 1968. Meanwhile, world trade patterns and transportation
modes have changed greatly. Furthermore, the Visby Protocol does not
address the issue of choice of forum clauses, leaving it to domestic courts
just as the Hague Rules did.
Adoption of the Hamburg Rules, written in 1978, would provide a
more modem approach to maritime law. The Transportation Claims and
Prevention Council, a U.S. shippers' association, has advocated this ap-
proach in Congress.
40
135. Mason, supra note 71, at 162.
136. Buhler, supra note 9, at 32.
137. See discussion of Sky Reefer infra.
138. Sturley, ProposedAmendments, supra note 27, at 614.
139. See discussion of the Visby Protocol infra.
140. Sturley, Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 614.
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Adoption of the Hamburg Rules has several advantages for the United
States. First, it is the most modem and forward-looking of all international
maritime conventions, written with recently-adopted and future technolo-
gies, such as multimodal transportation and EDI, in mind.141 Second, it is
the only international maritime convention to take a clear position on the
forum selection issue, thus giving a bright line rule and clarifying that issue
for domestic courts. 142 Third, the Hamburg Rules position, that forum se-
lection clauses in a contract should be held valid, is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sky Reefer. Therefore, adoption of this conven-
tion would give weight to that decision and bring U.S. judicial
interpretation in line with domestic maritime law.
Carriers do not like the higher liability provisions of the Hamburg
Rules, arguing that they are confusing and inconsistent 1 43 Due to this re-
sistance, Congress is unlikely to wholeheartedly embrace these rules with-
out some persuasion,14 especially since few U.S. trading partners have
adopted them.
However, good arguments for adoption of the Hamburg Rules exist.
One is that worldwide adoption may be imminent if the United States takes
the lead.145 Australia's readiness to adopt these rules has already been
noted. Canada, too, enacted a new Carriage of Goods by Water Act in
1993,146 with a provision to review adoption of the Hamburg Rules in five
years. Because the United States is Canada's second-largest trading part-
ner for goods carried by sea, U.S. approval of the Hamburg Rules would be
influential at the Canadian adoption review.
147
Hamburg Rules opponents make the argument that Canada, Australia
and other potential Hamburg Rules adopters are not important U.S. trading
partners. However, the United States should scrutinize this contention in
view of the changing world markets, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sky Reefer. 1
141. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 486.
142. See discussion infra.
143. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 490.
144. Ra at 498.
145. See infra note 65.
146. Mandelbaum, supra note 6, at 492.
147. Id.
148. See discussion infra.
149. Buhler, supra note 9, at 30.
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B. An International Convention to Lay the Groundwork for
Interpretation of Maritime Law.
Even when international law is clear, domestic courts may feel bound
to interpret it as consistent with domestic law,150 thus breaking interna-
tional uniformity and creating confusion on a global scale. 'This situation
may exist even when a nation ostensibly commits to a uniform interpreta-
tion of international conventions. English courts, for example, have held
that domestic precedent does not govern interpretation of the Hague
Rules.15 1 In cases such as Stag Line, Limited v. Foscolo, Mango & Com-
pany, however, they have indeed used precedent to guide such interpreta-
tion.
5 2
Rather than a convention to draft more modem maritime law, an in-
ternational convention to draft guidelines for interpretation of the current
law would better address the parochial interpretation impulse. Forum se-
lection clauses are a case in point. Much confusion has been created by
varying domestic interpretations of the "lessening of liability" language in
the Hague Rules Art. 3(8).
153
This problem might be resolved in two ways. First, terms, like less-
ening liability, that generate significant litigation should be more clearly
defimed by an international body. In the case of forum selection clauses,
these should include definitions of "liability," and what it means to
"lessen" liability.
Second, guidelines for interpretation in ambiguous cases should be
clearly spelled out. As an illustration of the benefit derived, consider that
English courts have formerly been unable to rely on the legislative history
of the Hague Rules in interpreting cases because of traditional legal meth-
odology in that forum. 154 Reliance on intent of the drafters, however, is
much more conducive to uniformity in international law than relying on
domestic precedent.155  Thus, more uniformity might be achieved by
drafting international guidelines to interpretation that advocate using the
intent of the framers in interpreting unclear clauses in international con-
ventions.
150. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 733.
151. Peacock, supra note 14, at 1000 n.187.
152. Id.; see (1932) A.C. 328, 350 (1931).
153. Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 4, at 796.
154. Id. at 740.
155. Peacock, supra note 14, at 1002.
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V. Conclusion
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MV Sky Reefer, the U.S. Supreme
Court set forth an internationalist policy for interpreting forum selection
clauses in maritime bills of lading. 5 According to the Court, the United
States should avoid domestic interpretations of international agreements as
a matter of policy if it intended to gain respect in the international commu-
nity.157 Underlying this policy was a recognition of the increasing impor-
tance of the global marketplace even for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses.
158
Given this recognition, the United States should look toward updating
its outmoded domestic maritime law, the 1936 COGSA. For forum selec-
tion clause issues, replacing the U.S. COGSA with the Hamburg Rules,
which clearly delineate an internationalist approach to choice of forum
clauses, would be a step forward.
However, adoption of the international convention only addresses a
part of the problem. Adoption must be coupled with international guide-
lines for the interpretation of that law. Only when the courts of each forum
cease to look principally to domestic law and begin to use the same meth-
odologies and definitions in interpreting international conventions will
choice of forum clauses have meaning in maritime bills of lading.
156. See Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 538.
157. See id
158. See id at 537.
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